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RESPONSE TO TAXPAYERS' STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Wasatch County agrees with Procedural Background and Relevant Fact Number 1.

2.

With regard to Fact Number 2, Wasatch County admits that it filed a cross petition
with the Utah Supreme Court. However, it disagrees with the Taxpayers'
assertion that by filing the cross petition the County exercised its option of seeking
review of the Tax Commission's decision in the Utah Supreme Court. See
Taxpayers' Brief at 7.

3.

With regard to Fact Number 3, Wasatch County disagrees that it filed a second
petition for review. Wasatch County affirmatively asserts that its cross petition
filed in the Utah Supreme Court was a responsive pleading to the Taxpayers'
petition for review and was merely filed to protect its rights in the Supreme Court
action.

4.

With regard to Fact Number 4, Wasatch County agrees that it filed a cross petition
and motion to stay in case number 20080304-CA with the Utah Supreme Court.
However, the County affirmatively asserts that it never filed any pleading entitled
"First Petition for Review of the Tax Commission's Final Decision," as Taxpayers
wrongfully claim. Id.

5.

With regard to Fact Number 5, Wasatch County agrees that its motion to stay
requested that this Court stay proceedings in case number 2008034-CA, but
specifically denies that it filed a "First Petition for Review" in the Utah Supreme
Court. See id. Wasatch County agrees with the Taxpayers' statement that this
Court granted the County's motion to stay.
1

6.

With regard to Fact Number 6, Wasatch County agrees with the majority of the
Taxpayers' quotation of this Court's Order granting the County's motion to stay.
However, Wasatch County disagrees that this Court labeled the County's cross
petition as "[Wasatch County's second Petition for Review]'' in its Order. See id.
This Court in fact stated: "[Wasatch County 's] petition for judicial review
pending in the Fourth District Court... as case number 0805001927[.]" Utah
Court of Appeals Order, at 1 (Case No. 200803 04-C A) (emphasis added). See
Exhibit 1.

7.

With regard to Fact Number 7, Wasatch County denies that it filed a ''Second
Petition for Review." Taxpayers' Brief at 8. Otherwise, Wasatch County agrees
with the remainder of Fact Number 7.

8.

Taxpayers' Brief is absent a Fact Number 8.

9.

With regard to Fact Number 9, Wasatch County denies that it filed a "second
appeal" in the district court action. Taxpayers' Brief dX 9. Otherwise, Wasatch
County agrees with the remainder of Fact Number 9.

10.

With regard to Fact Number 10, Wasatch County denies that it filed a "First
Petition for Review" with the Utah Supreme Court. Id. Wasatch County also
denies that its second Motion to Stay sought a delay of Taxpayers' Petition for
Review with this Court, and that such a motion would deprive Taxpayers of "their
right of appeal from the Tax Commission to this Court." Id. Otherwise, Wasatch
County agrees with the remainder of Fact Number 10.

11.

Wasatch County agrees with Taxpayers' Fact Number 11.
2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The County believes that it properly and accurately stated its argument as to why
this Court should reverse the district court's action to in its Brief filed on November 7,
2008. Therefore, this Reply will only address the issues raised by the Taxpayers and will
address each of the Taxpayers' arguments in the same order as the Taxpayers' Brief.
First, the County did not preclude itself from filing a petition for review in district
court by filing a cross appeal in the Utah Supreme Court action first because the County
was required to respond to Taxpayers' notice of appeal by filing a cross petition in order
to ask the supreme court to enlarge the County's rights or diminish the Taxpayers' rights.
If the County, as a responding party, failed to file a cross petition, the County would only
have been able to seek affirmation of the Tax Commission's decision.
Second, Taxpayers misconstrue the County's argument that it followed the proper
procedure for invoking de novo review in the district court outlined in Utah Code Section
59-1-602 and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Taxpayers distort the
County's argument in a strained effort to claim that the County should be required to pay
attorney fees. The County was not, as Taxpayers claim, attempting to force the district
court to use the Rules of Appellate Procedure in a de novo review. Whether de novo
review in district court includes an application of the Rules of Appellate Procedure is
irrelevant for the action before this Court.
Third, Taxpayers misconstrue the County's argument that a district court de novo
review is the most efficient manner of developing the factual issues in this case.
Taxpayers contend that the County's discussion on efficiency was to ask this Court to
3

decide an issue pertaining to allocation of value or to supplement the record before this
Court. However, as is clear from the County's Brief, the discussion on efficiency was
included merelv to emphasize that Section 59-1-602 should be interpreted in the County's
favor, which is exactly the issue before this Court.
Finally, the County's Appeal to this Court is not frivolous because it is warranted
b> existing law, specifically case law and statutory authority that squarel} contradict the
decision of the Third District Court. Thus. Taxpayers are not entitled to attorney fees.

4

DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

WASATCH COUNTY WAS REQUIRED TO FILE A CROSS APPEAL IN
ORDER TO PRESERVE ITS RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE LOWER COURT
DECISION AND THEREFORE WAS PROTECTING ITS RIGHTS.
The Taxpayers claim that Wasatch County's cross petition, filed in response to the

Taxpayers' supreme court petition for review, was a petition for review under Utah Code
Ann. § 59-l-602(l)(a). As a result, the Taxpayers argue that the County's district court
petition for review was precluded because the County had already filed a petition for
review. The Taxpayers accuse the County of "fabricating] legal and factual positions
that are not supported by Utah law or the record." Taxpayers' Brief at 11. They also
claim that the County is attempting to request "a judicial amendment of Utah Code Ann.
§59-1-602 to authorize the County's duplicative appeals to the Utah Supreme Court and
the Utah district court." Id. However, these assertions are unfounded. Further, the
County's position that its cross appeal was merely a protective pleading filed in response
to the Taxpayers' notice of appeal is clearly supported by Utah law.
Wasatch County was required to file a cross appeal in order to preserve its right to
challenge the Tax Commission's decision. The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear
that a cross petition must be filed by an opposing party if it seeks to have the appellate
court do anything other than affirm a lower court's decision.1 State v. South, 924 P.2d
354, 355-356 (Utah 1996). remanded to 932 P.2d 622 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied,

1

This rule holds true for both actions in the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of
Appeals. For example, in South, the issue before the Utah Supreme Court was whether
the Court of Appeals properly held that the State must file a cross appeal in order to raise
additional grounds for affirmance of the lower court's decision.
5

940 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1997), cited with approval in Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health
Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23. In South, the Utah Supreme Court held that a part) wishing
only for the appellate court to affirm the lower court's decision does not have to file a
cross petition. Id. at 355. In so holding, the court cited with approval the holding in
Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931), which held that a party responding to a notice of
appeal must cross petition the court if the responding party wishes to enlarge their own
rights or lessen the rights of their opponents. Id. at 355. In agreeing with Langnes, this
Court stated that the "Langnes rule" is "grounded in fairness, common sense, and judicial
efficiency." Id. at 356.
Further, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure contemplate that an appellee alone
is different from an appellee who is also a cross-appellant, and each has different rights.
For example, Rule 24, "Briefs," states:
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and
Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of
Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal.
URAP 24(g)(2) (emphasis added) (attached as Exhibit 2). As Rule 24 provides, an
appellee responds "to the issues raised in the Brief of the Appellant" and a crossappellant presents "issues raised in the cross-appeal." Id. Thus an appellee, who
is automatical^ a party of the appeal, is merely one who responds to the
arguments made by the appellant. On the other hand, an appellee ma\ also be a
cross-appellant if he or she has filed a cross-appeal.
This reading of Rule 24 corresponds to Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which applies to writs of certiorari. Under Rule 50, a brief in opposition is
6

filed in the Utah Supreme Court by the respondent for the purpose of "disclosing any
matter or ground why the case should not be reviewed by the Supreme Court/* URAP 50
(emphasis added) (attached as Exhibit 2). However, the respondent may also file a
"cross-petition for a writ of certiorari" if he or she desires to assert independent grounds
for supreme court review. See id.
Here, Wasatch County filed its cross petition with the Utah Supreme Court to
protect its rights to question the Tax Commission's decision. This was neither a petition
for review nor a separate action and was necessary to protect the County's interests in the
Taxpayers* petition for review. Wasatch County was not merely seeking affirmation of
the lower court decision and was therefore required to file the cross appeal. The
Taxpayers claim it would have confused them less if the County had, instead Ilk d a
"response" or similar pleading. However, such a pleading would not have allowed the
County to argue that its rights should be enlarged or that the Taxpayers' rights should be
lessened. As a result, Wasatch County was not filing a "First Petition" but was merely
filing a responsive, protective pleading as was required in the action that was initiated by
the Taxpayers' petition for review.
As the County explained in its Brief, the Tax Commission's decision was not
overwhelmingly in either party's favor and was essentially a compromise between tin
County and Appellees. See County Brief dX 21-22. As is clear from the South decision,
the County would have lost its ability to challenge the Tax Commission decision had it
not filed the cross petition. Failing to file a cross petition would certainly have benefited
the Taxpa\ers, but Wasatch County would have lost a significant right by not doing so.
7 *

B> filing a cross petition, the County responded to the petition for review filed by the
Osborns as it is required to do, and it also preserved its right to argue for something other
than mere affirmation of the Tax Commission decision.

II.

TAXPAYERS MISCONSTRUE THE COUNTY'S ARGUMENT THAT IT
FOLLOWED THE PROCEDURE FOR INVOKING DISTRICT COURT
JURISDICTION IN A FRIVOLOUS EFFORT TO REQUEST ATTORNEY
FEES.
The Taxpayers devote 4 V2 pages of their brief to discuss a statement in the

County's brief regarding the standard of review for the district court action and take the
County's statement out of context in a frivolous attempt to claim attorneys fees. For
example, the County states in its brief that it properly exercised the option to have the
district court conduct a de novo review by "faithfully follow [ing] the requirements of
section 59-l-602(l)(c) and Rule 14 [of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure]." County
Brief at 13-14. Taxpayers argue that the County's '* argument" is ^nonsensical"' and that
the County is "attempting to force the district court to conduct a 'trial de novo' using the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Taxpayers' Brief at 23 (emphasis added). The
action currentlv before this Court is to appeal the Third District Court's decision to
dismiss case number 080907392, not to determine the rules of procedure that the district
court will follow in carrying out the de novo review. The Countv merelv demonstrated
that it had properK invoked the jurisdiction of the district court. County Brief at 13. The
Countv also demonstrated that it followed Utah Code Section 59-l-602(l)(c) to invoke
the district court's jurisdiction.
8

The County also legitimately mentioned the de novo standard of review for the
purposes of discussing statutory interpretation. In discussing de novo review, the County
argued that it would be inappropriate to "narrowly constru[e] [Section 59-1-602], which
intends to preserve [the] option [of de novo review], in a manner that effectively
eviscerates the option [of de novo review] [ |

County Brief dX 16. The County

emphasized that by allowing each party to choose the forum in which to bring a petition
for review, Section 59-l-602(l)(a) necessarily lets each party choose between the two
standards of review—de novo in district court or a review o

•'

v

Utah Court

of Appeals or Supreme Court. Thus, a narrow construction of Section 59-1-602 to
disallow a district court petition for review because a cross petition is also filed in the
supreme court would deprive the County of its right to a trial de novo.
The question may be asked why the Taxpayers devote 4 Vi pages for an irrelevant
point that is not at issue. The answer comes in the very last sentence of the Taxpayers'
argument. The Taxpayers state, "Such arguments do not meet the good faith standard
under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure " hi al ^

i iiu. ii appears the

Taxpayers ask for attorney fees to rebut an argument that the County does not make and
that is not properly before this Court. Under such circumstances, it may be appropriate to
examine whether this portion of Taxpayers' brief itself was "interposed for tlic piirpose t
delay," or to "cause needless increase in the cost of litigation." See URAP 33(b)
(attached as Exhibit 2). However, in the interests of efficiency and decorum, the County
declines to do so.

9

III.

TAXPAYERS MISCONTRUE THE COUNTY'S DISCUSSION ON DE NOVO
REVIEW AS ATTEMPTING TO ASK THIS COURT TO CONSIDER AN
IMPROPER ISSUE.
In its Brief, the County recites some of the pertinent facts of the original appeal

before the Tax Commission, as well as the legal issue affected by those facts—the
allocation of value—to emphasize the point that many factual issues are in dispute that
are central to the parties' respective appeals. County Brief at 20-21. The County then
states that a district court de novo review is the most efficient manner of developing the
factual issues in this case, thus ensuring more effective and efficient consideration at the
appellate level. County Brief at 21. This argument was made to provide background as
to why this Court should construe Utah Code Sections 59-1-601 and 602, as well as Rule
14 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, to allow the County to proceed with its action in
district court without being precluded from doing so by the filing of the cross appeal the
day before.
Taxpayers misconstrue this statement as a request by the County for this Court to
decide an improper issue—the allocation issue—or as an attempt by the County to
supplement the record before this Court. However, the County's statement was merely
for the purposes of statutory interpretation, which is exactly the issue before this Court;
namely, how to properly interpret Utah Code Sections 59-1-601 and 602 and Rule 14. It
was not to ask this Court to decide the allocation issue or to supplement the record before
this Court. Taxpayers' argument on this point may be considered frivolous, as the
CountVs arguments are clear from a respectful reading of its Brief. Contrary to
Taxpayers' contentions, the County agrees wholeheartedl} with the statement that "the
10

only issue is whether or not the district court improperly determined that it lacked
jurisdiction" over the County's petition for review. Osborn Brief dX 29.

IV. TAXPAYERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES
Taxpayers have made a somewhat aggressive request for attorney's fees 011 tlic
basis that the County's appeal to this Court is frivolous under Rule of Appellate
Procedure 33. Damages may be awarded if an appeal is either frivolous or interposed
merely for delay. URAP 33(a) (attached as Exhibit 2). An appeal is interposed for the
purpose of delay if it is "'interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause
needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party
filing the appeal." URAP 33(b).
As the only delay in Taxpayers' separate appeal of the I ax Commission's decision
was granted by this Court in response to the County's motion, no legitimate argument can
be made that the present appeal caused any undue delay to the Taxpayers' appeal. See
Exhibit 1. Moreover, as the County is merely attempting to assert a right that Utali law
affords it (to obtain a de novo review of the Tax Commission decision) in order to fill a
void in the evidence found to exist by the Tax Commission (how to allocate value within
the ten-acre building areas), it can also hardly be said to have filed the present appeal ft t
the purposes of harassment or to needlessly increase the costs of litigation. All that is
left, therefore, is Taxpayers' argument that the County's appeal is frivolous.

1!

The burden to show frivolity is a heavy one.2 Even a meritless appeal is not
necessaril} frivolous. L.C. v. State, 963 P.2d 761, 765 (Utah App. 1998) (in the context
of an Anders brief, "this court must be assured that an issue is not just meritless, but that
counsel has engaged in sufficient analysis of the record and case law to be secure in the
belief that the issues are frivolous").

Thus Taxpayers must show not only that the

County's appeal is entirely meritless, but they must also show that the arguments in
support of the County's appeal were not advanced wibased on a good faith argument to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law." URAP 33(b). However, instead of attempting
to meet this burden, Taxpayers argue points not at issue in this appeal and leave the
County's arguments all but untouched.
For example. Taxpayers' brief ignores the question of how the County should
have, in their view, protected its rights in their supreme court appeal and still prosecuted
its own district court appeal. Apparently, therefore, Taxpayers' position is simply that it
cannot ever be done: a litigant before the Tax Commission will always lose one appellate
right or the other if another litigant exercises a different appellate right. However,
Taxpayers' brief does not square this awkward position with the precedent and rules
which not only permit but require cross-appeals. Where Taxpayers' brief ignores entire
swaths of the County's opening brief it is difficult for their argument relating to frivolity
to have merit.
The County's appeal to this Court, on the other hand, is warranted b\ existing law
that directly contradicts the arguments of the Taxpayers and the ruling of Third District
2

And, in the County's opinion, it is one that should not be undertaken lightly.
12

Court. By filing a petition for review in district court, the County was exercising its
statutory right to choose its forum to challenge the Tax Commission's decision. Under
the Langnes rule, it is clear that the County was not filing a duplicative appeal since the
cross petition was not a petition for review under Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-602(l)(a), but
was rather a responsive pleading filed to protect the County's right to ask the Utah
Supreme Court for something other than mere affirmation of the Tax Commission's
decision. Thus Wasatch County's position that its cross petition was merely a protective
and legally required pleading is in fact "supported by Utah law." See Taxpayers' Brief at
11.
For the foregoing reasons, Taxpayers are not entitled to an award of attorney fees.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Wasatch County asks this Court to reverse the district
court's dismissal of the county's de novo review and to reinstate that review.
Furthermore, Wasatch County asks this Court to deny Taxpayers' request for attorney
fees.
DATED this ^Q-fc

da

>' of January, 2009.

THOMAS L.lOW y
KEVrN S. THURMAN
ATTORNEYS FOR WASATCH COUNTY
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EXHIBIT 1

riutu

UTAH APPPi.LATEC

IN THE UTAH COURT OF A??EA!

JUN 0 i 2008
>oOoo

Warren and Tricia Osborn;
Michael F. Sullivan; David ar
Cynthia Mirsky; Norman Provar
Jeffrey and Nancy Trumper;
Gary and Catherine Crittender
David Checketts: and Mount
Clyde Enterprise LC,

ORDER
: a s e No.

2008C304-CA

RECEIVED
JUN 05 2008

D

etitioners,
WASATCH COUNTS A T O M ' S OFFICE!

Wasatch County,

v.
U t a h S t a t e Tax C o m m i s s i o n ,
Kesoonaent.

Before judges Billings, Davis, and McHugh.
This case is before the court on Cross-Petitioner Wasatch
County's motion to stay proceedings on Petitioner's petition for
review and its own cross-petition pending disposition of a
petition for judicial review pending in the Fourth District Court
for Wasatch County pending as case number 0805001927, which seeks
de novo review of the same order of the Ucah State Tax Commission
pursuant to Utah Code section 59-1-601. See Utah Code Ann. § 591-601 (2006); see also Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-602(1) (a) (2006)
(allowing a party the option to petition for judicial review of a
decision of the Utah State Tax Commission in either the district
court or the appellate court) . Based upon the motion and
responses of one parties,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that proceedings on the petition and
cross-petition before this court are suayed pending disposition
of Wasatch Counuy's petition for judicial review pending as case
number 0805001092 in the Fourth District Court for Wasatch
County.'

IT IS FUPTHEP ORDERED that: the pari.es snail prov_.de
separate or ]c:nt reports O H the states of tne disiric: court
proceedings ninety days frorr tne date of c m s order and each
ninety da/s cnereafcer w m i e c m s stay order remains m effeci
Dat]ed t m s J_

day of Jane, 2C08.

FOR THE COURT

"udicn K. 3-.II-.ngS; Judge

V

CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC

hereby

certify
:ne r c r e q o i n ORDER was
p i a c e a in Interdepartme

Fune 4, 2 0 0 8 , a t r u (
• mp
i ir, i f ppi
deposited
,d j.

RANDY M. GRIMSHAW
MAXWELL A. MILLER
MATTHEW D COOK
PARSONS EEKLE & LATIMER
201 S MAIN STE 1300
PO BOX 45898
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0898
CLARK L. SNELSON
TIMOTHY A BODILY
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 5TH FL
PC BOX 14 087 4
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0874
THOMAS L LOW
WASATCH COUNTY ATTORNEY
805 W 100 S

) P t" P n

June 4, 200J

r r. - <?.

uepuoy ^ierK
Case No. 20080304
Distncu Court No. 06-1504

it id_L i x i i u

:opy
^r p ^P c

to be deliverec

of

EXHIBIT 2

RULE 14

http://www.utcouTts.gov/resources/rules/urap/14.htrn

Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained; intervention.
(a) Petition for review of order; joint petition. When judicial review by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is provided by
statute of an order or decision of an administrative agency, board, commission, committee, or officer (hereinafter the term
"agency" shall include agency, board, commission, committee, or officer), a petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of the
appellate court within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time prescribed, then within 30 days after the date of the
written decision or order. The petition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the respondent(s) and the order
or decision, or part thereof, to be reviewed. In each case, the agency shall be named respondent. The State of Utah shall be
deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so designated in the petition. If two or more persons are entitled
to petition for review of the same order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint petition
for review and may thereafter proceed as a single petitioner.
(b) Filing fees. At the time of filing any petition for review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk of the appellate
court the filing fee established by law. The clerk shall not accept a petition for review unless the filing fee is paid.
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for review shall be served by the petitioner on the named respondent(s), upon all
other parties to the proceeding before the agency, and upon the Attorney General of Utah, if the state is a party, in the manner
prescribed by Rule 3(e). The petitioner, at the time of filing the petition for review, shall also file with the clerk of the appellate
court a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding who have been served.
(d) Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under this rule shall serve upon all parties to the proceeding
and upon all parties who participated before the agency, and file with the clerk of the appellate court a motion for leave to
intervene. The motion shall contain a concise statement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds upon which
intervention is sought. A motion for leave to intervene shall be filed within 40 days of the date on which the petition for review is
filed.
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Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate
headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal
contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which
appears immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations,
rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they
are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set
out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the
citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief
under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the
facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be
a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not
be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue
not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal
shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under
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this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the
brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a
table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance
cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in
all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court
as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the
contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the
statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the
appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall
conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant"
and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the
agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the
employee," "the injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g).
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner
and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as
marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be
made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or
rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of
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contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or
portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving crossappeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the
court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50
pages, and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in
the appeal.
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues
raised in the cross-appeal.
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of
Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of CrossAppellant.
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the
Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good
cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this
rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the number of additional
pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven
days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the
brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the
draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to
an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is
granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than
one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any
number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by
reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth
the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference
either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the
letter shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not
exceed 350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly
limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with
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accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees
against the offending lawyer.
Advisory Committee Notes
Rule 24(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re Beesley,
883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987).
"To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's
advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the challenger
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists."' ONEIDA/SLIC, v.
ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994)
(alteration in original)(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah
App. 1991)). See also State ex rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell
v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah
App. 1990).
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable
standard of review and citation of supporting authority.
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Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal
case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs,
as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may
order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other
paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a
good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose
such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. A
party may request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for summary
disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a
motion or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to the
party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such damages should not be
awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the
damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good
cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant
a hearing.
Advisory Committee Notes
Rule 33 is substantially redrafted to provide definitions and procedures for assessing
penalties for delays and frivolous appeals.
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court must award damages. This is in keeping
with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the amount of damages -- single
or double costs or attorney fees or both - is left to the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is
amended to make express the authority of the court to impose sanctions upon the party or
upon counsel for the party. This rule does not apply to a first appeal of right in a criminal case
to avoid the conflict created for appointed counsel by Anders v. California, 386 US 738 (1967)
and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). Under the law of these cases, appointed
counsel must file an appeal and brief if requested by the defendant, and the court must find
the appeal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the appeal.
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Rule 50. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus curiae.
(a) Brief in opposition. Within 30 days after service of a petition the respondent shall file an
opposing brief, disclosing any matter or ground why the case should not be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. Such brief shall comply with Rules 27 and, as applicable, 49. Seven copies
of the brief in opposition, one of which shall contain an original signature, shall be filed with
the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
(b) Page limitation. A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible and may not, in any
single case, exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table of authorities, any
verbatim quotations required by Rule 49(a)(7), and the appendix.
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a petition for a writ of
certiorari will be received. Objections to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to grant the writ
of certiorari may be included in the brief in opposition.
(d) Distribution of filings. Upon the filing of a brief in opposition, the expiration of the time
allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file, the petition and the brief in opposition, if
any, will be distributed by the clerk for consideration. However, if a cross-petition for a writ of
certiorari has been filed, distribution of both it and the petition for a writ certiorari will be
delayed until the filing of a brief in opposition by the cross-respondent, the expiration of the
time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file.
(e) Reply brief. A reply brief addressed to arguments first raised in the brief in opposition
may be filed by any petitioner, but distribution under paragraph (d) of this rule will not be
delayed pending the filing of any such brief. Such brief shall be as short as possible, but may
not exceed five pages. Such brief shall comply with Rule 27. The number of copies to be filed
shall be as described in Rule 50(a).
(f) Brief of amicus curiae. A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed only by leave of the
Supreme Court granted on motion or at the request of the Supreme Court. Parties to the
proceeding in the Court of Appeals may indicate their support for, or opposition to, the motion.
A motion for leave shall identify the interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why a
brief of an amicus curiae is desirable. Except as all parties otherwise consent, an amicus
curiae shall file its brief within the time allowed the party whose position it will support, unless
the Supreme Court for cause shown shall grant leave for later filing, in which event it shall
specify within what period an opposing party may answer. Such brief shall comply with Rules
27, and, as applicable, 49. The brief may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index,
the table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule 49(a)(7), and the appendix.
The number of copies to be filed shall be as described in Rule 50(a).
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